Using proprietary data, this study examines auditor industry specialisation, professional brand effects and non-audit services (NAS) in the self-managed superannuation fund (SMSF) sector, the fastest growing and largest segment of the Australian $1.75 trillion retirement savings industry. We consider the impact of industry leadership for a large sample of SMSF audits for the three years to June 2010. After controlling for factors known to determine audit fees, we find evidence of fee discounting for the leading suppliers of SMSF audits, consistent with Simunic (1980)'s assertion of competition in the small audit client market. When considering the impact of professional affiliations, we find that registered company auditors and members of professional bodies who comply with auditing and ethical standards receive a fee premium. In terms of auditor independence, the supply of NAS is shown to improve the auditors' ability to report breaches, suggesting no independence concerns arising from joint supply of audit and NAS in this setting.
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INTRODUCTION
This study examines auditor industry specialisation, professional affiliations and non-audit services in the Self-Managed Superannuation Funds (SMSFs) market, the largest segment of the Australian pension fund industry (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2013) . 1 The country now has the world's fourth biggest pension fund sector in the world with total assets in excess of $1.75 trillion, the equivalent of Australia's annual GDP (Towers Watson 2013) . Consistent with its economic importance, the Government commissioned the Super System Review (2010) into the governance, efficiency, structure and operation of Australia's superannuation (hereafter the Cooper Review). The Cooper review highlights, amongst its findings, a lack of basic knowledge and understanding of the SMSF segment and its auditors.
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Using a sample of just under 100,000 SMSFs over the years of 2008-2010, we consider a number of research questions. First we examine whether industry specialist auditors earn fee premiums in the SMSF segment in Australia. The research setting is interesting given that traditional agency cost issues associated with publically listed companies are not present in this sample since the owners of SMSFs are effectively the managers. This suggests that price considerations will dominate quality considerations as reputation effects will matter little in the demand for SMSF audits and hence the SMSF trustee has incentives to seek the lowest priced audit. Price sensitive demand, large numbers of funds which are 'small' and homogeneous, relatively simple client structure coupled with a large number of suppliers imply that this is an ideal setting for which to test economies of scale effects in auditing (Simunic, 1980) . 3 In prior literature on pension plan audits in the US setting, Cullinan (1998b) observes that there is something of a research void on auditing in the retirement savings industry. 4 We contribute to addressing this scarcity of economics of auditing effort in relation to the pension market by providing new evidence in an out of US sample context. Further, we build on the prior pension plan audit pricing literature (Cullinan 1997 (Cullinan , 1998a ) by supplementing controls likely to impact audit fees in an
Australian pension industry context with additional explanatory variables including cash balance, investments in artwork and collectibles, the number of members, the existence of reserve accounts and the presence of assets acquired by related parties.
Second, we extend the audit pricing literature that observes pricing predominantly by CPA firms to a setting where auditors have eight possible professional affiliations. 5 Specifically, we examine whether registered company auditors and members of professional bodies, who are required to comply with auditing and ethical standards, receive a fee premium for perceived higher quality audits than auditors who are members of professional bodies who do not enforce auditing and ethical standards. This follows Dunmore and Falk (2001) who suggest that the professional certification body with which an accountant is affiliated provides a signal of their quality. Last, we investigate the impact of the supply of non-audit services (NAS) on auditor independence proxied for by the propensity of auditors to qualify the SMSF annual return and report breaches to the ATO. 3 We note that Simunic (1980) assumes competition in the market for small company audits suggesting the absence of auditor industry specialist fee premiums. However in the small client segment, there is mixed evidence in the prior audit fee literature. Ferguson and Stokes (2002) finds no evidence of industry leader premiums in the small client segment, whilst Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker (2004) and DeFond, Francis, and Wong (2000) do. A new setting offers the opportunity to contribute insights to the literature investigating specialisation effects in the small client segment. 4 'At the current stage of development, much less is known regarding the pension audit market than for the public company audit market '. (p.72) . 5 Currently the Auditor-General (AG), registered company auditors (RCA) and members from six professional bodies can audit self-managed superannuation funds. These include members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA); members of the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants (CPA); members of the Institute of Public Accountants (IPA); members or Fellows of the Association of Taxation and Management Accountants (ATMA); fellows of the National Taxation and Accountants' Association (NTAA); and specialist auditors of the SMSF Professionals' Association of Australia (SPAA).
Specifically, we address a recommendation from the Cooper Review about the effects on independence when approved auditors provide both audit and non-audit services, a common regulatory concern across the globe over the past decade (European Commission 2002 , SarbannesOxley Act 2002 , Securities and Exchange Commission 2000 , 2003 .
We observe the following research findings. First, consistent with Simunic (1980) 's assertion of competition in the small client segment, we find evidence of fee discounting for the leading suppliers of SMSF audits, suggesting that this high volume, low-cost setting facilitates supplier scale effects, which price sensitive clients utilize. Second, we find evidence of audit fee premiums for auditors with higher quality professional affiliations that are required to comply with auditing and ethical standards. Third, we find the supply of NAS promotes additional propensity to qualify and report breaches to the ATO. This implies the supplying of NAS promotes greater knowledge of the client whilst posing no independence threat.
Fourth, when the dependent variable is re-defined to non-audit fees in additional testing, our findings indicate that the leading firms (defined by market share) earn significant fee premiums. This suggests that specialists in this setting use audits as a conduit to supply higher margin NAS. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section details prior literature and sets out the research hypotheses. The third section outlines the model specification, sample, data and descriptive statistics. The fourth section reports and discusses the empirical results, while the fifth section concludes.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Background to self-managed superannuation funds
Self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs), as the name implies, are pension funds which are managed and controlled by the members themselves. That is the members are simultaneously the trustees/directors. They are also often referred to as Do-It-Yourself (or DIY) funds. The main attractions of SMSFs to individuals are the regulatory arrangements which provide flexible investment options such as the ability to invest in direct assets (shares and property, including business premises) and the capacity to borrow via instalment warrants (Mackenzie 2011a (Mackenzie , 2011b . 6 SMSFs were officially created on 8 October 1999, when the Superannuation Industry Supervision (SIS) Act was amended to change the regulatory arrangements for small superannuation funds. Before that date, all superannuation funds were regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and were categorised as follows: corporate superannuation funds, public sector superannuation funds, industry superannuation funds, retail superannuation funds, rollover funds and excluded superannuation funds (which were funds of less than five members). The amendments created a new category of superannuation fund, the SMSF, to be regulated by the ATO rather than APRA. The previous excluded funds were given a one-off opportunity to become a SMSF or remain under APRA and become known as small APRA fund (SAF). Members of SAFs can have input into investment decisions, but do not have the direct investment control enjoyed by SMSFs members as trustee duties and responsibilities must be provided by an external approved trustee (Sy 2010; Roberts 2001 Roberts , 2002 . With the costs of running a SAF greater due to trustee remuneration expenses and higher regulatory fees, combined with the lack of control, the majority of excluded funds elected to become a SMSF. Only SAF trustees are allowed to receive remuneration for providing services to the pension fund and the annual supervisory levy charged by APRA is $590 for 2012/13 compared to the $259 levy being charged by the ATO for SMSFs in 2013/14. Over 2009-10 a review into the governance, efficiency, structure and operation of Australia's superannuation was conducted (Cooper 2010) . Among the 177 recommendations in the final report there were 15 for the SMSF sector, including two in relation to their auditors. The first relevant recommendation relating to this study is that the Australian Securities Investments Commission (ASIC) be appointed as the registration body for approved SMSF auditors, giving ASIC the power to determine the qualifications required for eligibility to serve as an SMSF auditor. 8 The second relevant recommendation to this study is the Cooper Review's stated concerns surrounding the independence standards of approved auditors, in particular its objection to the joint supply of audit and non-audit services. Our evidence relating to H3 (developed below) provides evidence in relation to such independence concerns. Simunic (1980) does not observe evidence of brand name product differentiation in the small client segment. 9 The implication of Simunic (1980) 's findings in the small client segment is that the presence of industry specialist premiums is unlikely due to the maintained assumption of price competition. However, the evidence for industry specialist premiums in the small client segment is mixed, with Ferguson and Stokes (2002) and Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) finding no evidence of industry specialist or leadership premiums in this segment, whilst Defond, Francis and 7 Government policy over the past 25 years, such as the introduction of the compulsory superannuation contribution (currently 9.25 percent of an employee's salary) and favourable tax incentives (such as 15 percent concessional tax rate and tax-free withdrawals upon retirement), has facilitated a rapid increase in superannuation assets in Australia. 8 Since 31 January 2013, ASIC has the responsibility for the monitoring and registration of approved SMSF auditors 9 Evidence of brand name pricing in the small client segment subsequent to Simunic (1980) is summarized in Peel and Roberts (2003) which shows some support for brand name fee premiums in the small client segment.
Prior literature
Wong (2000) find specialist premiums in both the small and large client segments sample-wide despite the non-Big 6 leader in Hong Kong property industry charging lower fees. Still other studies find evidence of specialist audit fee premiums in the small client segment only (Casterella, Francis, Lewis, and Walker 2004) .
There has been little prior research devoted to audit pricing in the retirement funds (superannuation and pension) industry. The main exception is Cullinan (1997 Cullinan ( , 1998a ) who investigates audit fees in the context of US pension funds. Cullinan (1997) considers audit pricing implications for a sample of 1,110 pension plans for US firms with at least 100 employees using a sample from 1991. Cullinan identifies descriptive evidence consistent with the non-Big 6 having a sizeable presence in this sector, with the Big 6 accounting firms having only a ten percent client share in the pension plan audit market. 10 Cullinan (1998a) extends this work by investigating auditor industry specialisation effects using the same 1991 dataset but instead for a sample of 993 US multiemployer pension plans. He finds a premium for the non-Big 6 industry specialist, Thomas Havey & Company.
Evidence from prior audit pricing literature indicates the presence of scale economies to larger suppliers, with Eichenseher and Danos (1982) and Danos and Eichenseher (1986) for example, noting that scale economies accrue to large auditors in high regulation settings. Consistent with assertions of possible scale benefits to auditors in the SMSF segment, the superannuation industry is considered to be complex (Moroney and Simnett 2009) . Pension funds may benefit from economies of scale due to greater volumes of assets under management and the ability to be able to negotiate lower fees with external investment managers, as their bargaining power will increase as the size of the investment mandates increases (Coleman, Esho, and Wong, 2006) . 10 The dominance of the non-Big 6 in the pension plan setting bears similarities to the dominance of the non-Big 6 in the market for Australian mining development stage entities documented in Ferguson, Pundrich, and Raftery (2013 eight mid-tier firms it was found that industry-based experience has a more significant impact on auditor performance than task-based experience (Moroney and Carey 2011) .
Hypotheses development
The proprietary ATO data for Australian SMSFs has a number of important empirical properties. First, as indicated earlier, we have a substantial sample size with approximately 100,000 funds across three years. Second, despite collectively being part of a large industry, many SMSFs (and their audits) are quite small in size on an individual basis. Third, a feature of the SMSF audit environment is the large discretion the client retains in choosing who will do the audit. This suggests there is a bigger range of potential assurance providers available to the client and the potential for greater competition. Combined, these sector attributes imply that a specialised audit firm may be in a better position to source production economies (Stigler 1958 ). Accordingly we propose the following hypothesis:
H 1 : Industry leaders will earn lower audit fees from self-managed superannuation funds than non-industry leaders.
Agency costs have been the focus of a number of studies of the Australian superannuation industry (Coleman et al. 2006; Drew and Stanford 2003a, 2003b (2011) Professional affiliations have differentiated the services of accountants and auditors for over 160 years with designations such as "chartered accountant" and "CPA" evolving as brand names (Parker 2005 
Board 2006)
. 16 As it is a requirement of their membership that auditors comply with these auditing and ethical standards, it is expected that members of these three bodies produce higher quality audits.
As a result we propose the following hypothesis: The Cooper Review (2010) articulates concerns about the independence of SMSF approved auditors. The final report adopted a harsh position recommending that auditors should not be providing SMSFs with any other services. 17 The ATO has previously identified that where the same firm performs both the tax return and the audit there is an increased risk of breach not being identified or reported which is one of the risk criteria when selecting SMSFs for an audit for potential noncompliance with the SIS Act 1993 and SIS Regulations 1994 . (CPA, ICAA, and NIA 2008b . This concern is supported by much of the audit literature which argues that non-audit supply mitigates breach detection and reporting where the less independent auditor is less likely to issue a negative report (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson 2002; DeFond, Raghunandan, and Subramanyam 2002; Krishnan 1994; Reynolds and Francis 2000) . However, more recent research has found that more non-audit services assists the auditor in 'knowing the client' and appears to encourage rather than inhibit reporting of breaches (Craswell, Stokes, and 
RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES
Research design
Control variables
We apply a similar audit fee model to that first specified by Simunic (1980) including size, risk and complexity controls. In our study the application of proprietary data enables us to augment the audit fee model with a number of superannuation industry specific explanatory variables. This allows us to specify an audit fee model bearing some similarities to that utilized by Cullinan (1998a) . To control for size we include additional measures for the number of members in the fund (PARTICIPANTS) and the natural log of total concessional contributions received during the year (LCONT). We expect the coefficients for these variables to be positive. With SMSFs being the only type of superannuation fund that has the ability to invest in assets such as artwork and collectibles (ARTWORK), we include a dummy variable to control for this unique asset class. We expect a positive coefficient as the valuation of the artwork may be difficult to determine and there may be additional audit work to ensure that the investment satisfies the sole-purpose test of providing benefits for retirement. We also control for funds with reserve accounts (RESERVEACCTS) as reserving may be a strategy employed by trustees to ensure that a fund member does not pass the concessionally-taxed contribution limit. We expect a positive coefficient for this variable given its higher audit risk.
Further, we include a dummy variable for whether a fund holds any investments acquired via related parties, known as in-house assets, (INHOUSE) as the relevant in-house asset rules applicable to SMSFs are onerous and therefore likely to require extra audit work.
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Another control is the natural log of the cash balance of the fund (LCASH). The expectation is that funds with larger cash balances will have lower risk and hence should have lower audit fees.
Accordingly, we expect a negative coefficient on LCASH. We include controls for the natural log of property (LPROPERTY) and shares (LSHARES) and expect positive coefficients as the audit complexity increases with the increased holding of these growth assets. We control for the return on assets (ROA) as a measure of relative performance of SMSFs. With most funds likely to employ 'set and forget' investment strategies, we control for funds that dispose of assets during the year (DISPOSAL) as this represents extra audit work and hence we expect a positive coefficient.
We include an audit report lag variable (LAG) for those funds that had their audit completed after the lodgement due date. As lateness may indicate incremental audit effort or the presence of contentious compliance issues, we expect a positive coefficient. With most super funds having relatively low levels of borrowings, we exclude the current asset and quick ratios and include a further dummy variable for those funds that have borrowed funds (BORROWING). 19 An experimental variable is added to the fee model to specify the top ten leading auditors (LEADER_ALL).
Model for Empirical Analysis
We estimate the audit fees for SMSFs using the following OLS regression model;
The level of in-house assets from related parties that a SMSF can hold is limited to five percent of a fund's overall asset value. Where a SMSF exceeds the five per cent limit at the end of an income year, the SIS Act (1993) requires the trustee to prepare a written plan to dispose of one or more in-house assets at least equal to the value by which the five percent limit was exceeded. The Cooper Review (2010) The error term, e, is assumed to have normal OLS regression properties.
To test audit pricing implications of professional affiliations consistent with H2, the model specification documented in equation (1) is modified in the following manner.
LEADER_ALL is removed and is replaced by the following three dummy experimental variables according to the professional affiliation of the SMSF auditor; the Auditor-General (or delegate) of the Commonwealth, a state or territory (AG), registered company auditors (RCA) and SMSF auditors that are members of one of the three professional bodies (the 20 As SMSFs generally report assets at historical cost, valuation and accounting practices might lead to incorrect calculations of ROA. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that market value reporting is becoming more common for SMSFs, particularly for those funds invested substantially in listed shares, managed funds and cash assets. There may be differences between the deductible amounts included in the SMSF annual return and the actual expenditure on fund costs. For example, such costs could include life insurance and related cover, where only a portion of the premium is deductible depending on the type of insurance cover. As insurance is optional for SMSFs members, we have excluded insurance premiums in ROA calculations for consistency. In sensitivity testing, we include insurance premiums in ROA calculations and find no change to primary results reported. 21 Any control variable where logarithmic transformations are undertaken has '0' values re-coded to the natural log of one (i.e. zero) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Sample
The characteristics of the sample of SMSFs are reported in Panel A of Table 1 . In total the data includes SMSF fund level characteristics for a random sample of 73,000 SMSFs in accumulation 22 Care needs to be taken with the interpretation of results as it is possible that some auditors may be members of a few different professional bodies as well as being registered company auditors. 23 Audit quality is considered to reflect the joint probability of finding and reporting breaches (DeAngelo 1981). phase in each of the three years to 30 June 2010, that is 219,002 different funds combined. 24 The sample was modified as follows: 5,939 funds were discarded due to incomplete financial information provided in their annual returns, 112,803 funds were removed due to the audit fees paid not being separately disclosed and a further 592 funds were excluded as they had extreme absolute return on assets greater than 100 percent. The remaining 99,668 SMSF-year observations are used in the study.
The 2008 financial year was the first year that audit fees were separately disclosed in the annual reports of SMSFs and could be the explanation for the steady increase in observations that have disclosed audit fees in 2009 and 2010.
(Insert Table 1 
Industry Leadership
The market share data for the ten leading individual audit firms for the sample in terms of both client (SMSF) numbers and audit fees is presented in Panel C of Table 1 . The combined market share of only 4.75 percent for all SMSF observations in our sample for the ten leaders indicates that there are many individual firms conducting SMSF audits across Australia, and these leading firms account for only 3.27 percent of total audit fees. The leading supplier of audit services (LEADER_1) holds a 1.37 percent SMSF client market share (0.91 percent of audit fees disclosed), almost triple the 24 The sample of 73,000 SMSFs each year was selected by the ATO on a random basis. Our data is not a balanced panel and is an acknowledged limitation of this study. SMSFs that are in pension phase were not provided by the ATO as they are not entitled to a deduction for expenses incurred in deriving exempt income and do not disclose accurate information for comparative purposes. Due to privacy constraints with our dataset, we are unable to ascertain the age of neither the SMSF members. In addition there were no fund identifiers provided implying our data is anonymised.
average market share of the other nine leading firms (LEADER_OTHER) who hold a combined 3.38 percent share of total SMSF audit clients (2.36 percent of audit fees disclosed). For model specification purposes, a separate dummy experimental variable is used for the top ten leading (LEADING_ALL) auditors. In sensitivity testing, in a manner bearing similarities to Ferguson et al. (2003) , separate dummy experimental variables are used for the LEADER_1 and LEADER_OTHER respectively.
The market share by auditor professional body affiliation is presented in Panel D of Table 1 .
In our sample, CPA is the leader of the SMSF audit market in terms of both clients and fees. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) for variables used to estimate audit fees are presented in Table 2 . Panels A, B and C of 25 T-Tests of differences in means on raw descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 indicate no significant differences in means between years. Such an interpretation is not sensitive to assumptions of equality of variances (Levenes Test). Non (Insert Table 2 
Industry Expertise
We begin by estimating the leading firm premiums for individual SMSF audit firms across the sample of 99,668 SMSFs as per Equation 1. Panels A, B and C of Table 3 (Insert Table 3 here)
In terms of the additional control variables, the coefficient on the cash balance of the firm (LCASH) is positive but not significant. The coefficient of funds with in-house assets (INHOUSE) is positive and significant at p<.001, suggesting that more audit effort is needed when a fund engages in related party transactions. The coefficients on funds that report late (LAG) and funds that receive a qualified audit opinion (OPINION) are positive and significant at p<.001 across both yearly results along with pooled analysis.
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In relation to the experimental variables, underpinning tests of H1, the dummy variable for the ten leading firms (LEADER_ALL) has a negative and significant coefficient of -.304 (Panel D, Table   3 ). The economic interpretation of these coefficients suggests that leading SMSF auditors charge a 34.6 percent fee discount compared to non-leaders, suggestive of scale economies to the large auditors in this market segment. 28 This finding can be contrasted with Cullinan (1998a) who finds fee premiums accrue to industry leaders who audit pension funds. 29 Thus we find evidence consistent with larger auditors charging lower fees with a plausible magnitude of discount in order of 35%.
Interestingly the discount by large suppliers observed in the market where agency costs are absent roughly equates to the premium most large auditors derive evidenced in many empirical studies of audit fees in markets where agency costs are present.
(Insert Table 4 here)
Professional body affiliation
The results of this test run for the various members of the different professional bodies who can audit SMSFs are reported in Table 7 here) Audit quality (Insert Table 5 here)
The results of this estimation for the ten leading individual audit firms are reported in client' and appears to encourage rather than inhibit reporting of breaches. 32 The possibility of independence threats resulting from the provision of other services should not be a concern to regulators as the level of non-audit fees does not appear to affect the propensity to issue unqualified audit opinions (Craswell et al. 2002; Ruddock et al. 2006 ), but rather enhances it. . We conduct several sensitivity tests. First, when we split the LEADER_ALL variable, the coefficients for LEADER_1 (-1.386) and LEADER_OTHER (-.700) remain both highly negative and significant at p<.001. Second, to control for a potential correlation between breach reporting and subsequent non audit fees, we categorise breaches as either 'good' or 'bad' depending on the additional compliance work required. We find no difference to reported results. 32 When we re-run this test for the members of the various professional bodies (shown in Table 6 ), we find positive and significant results for the auditor-general, registered company auditors and CPA members. Interestingly, in this model, the provision of non-audit services (OTHERSERVICES) is significant each year and in pooled analysis.
(Insert Table 6 here) Donohoe and Knechel (2013) find that the pricing of audit services by auditor industry specialists is conditional on the provision of tax advice. We expect that in an industry, such as superannuation, where advice is more highly valued, that the higher margin NAS will contribute to the generation of fee premiums for industry leading auditors. Consistent with prior studies such as Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995) and Ferguson and Stokes (2002) , we reconfigure our dependent variable (from audit fees to fees from non-audit services) and include the natural log of audit fees (LAF) as an additional independent variable. The estimation of non-audit fees for the leading individual audit firms is reported in Table 7 . 33 Since the dependent variable is now defined as nonaudit fees, rather than audit fees we eliminate a number of funds that did not have other services provided and the sample decreases to 11,016 SMSFs in total. The model reported in Panel D of suggesting that whilst the leading firms charge a discount for their audit work, they derive a significant fee premium from the supply of non-audit services. Interestingly, the coefficient for LAF (-.267) is negative and significant at p<.001, in contrast with most prior findings in the literature observing a positive relationship between audit fees and NAS. 34 This implies the more NAS an 33 Non-audit fees are not separately disclosed in the SMSF annual return but the proxy for NAS is other management and administration expenses less the annual supervisory levy of $150 in these years. This expense category excludes the other main running costs of an SMSF such as interest, investment expenses, insurance premiums and depreciation as these are disclosed separately in the annual return. 34 In a meta-analysis of audit fees, Hay, Knechel, and Wong (2006) note that non-audit services has a significant positive relationship with audit fees in 16 out of 19 prior studies. They only find two studies with a significant but negative relationship with one study being insignificant. In sensitivity testing of this result, we place the log of non-audit fees (LNAF) as an additional independent variable in the primary audit fee models shown in Tables 3 and 4 and still find a significant but negative relationship for this sub-sample.
Additional tests
Non-audit services (NAS)
auditor supplies the relatively cheaper its audit fee becomes. We do not observe any significant result for OPINION suggesting that breach reporting is not affected by supply of additional NAS.
35
(Insert Table 8 here)
We repeat this analysis, testing the implications of membership of the various professional bodies on the level of non-audit fees (shown in indicating the presence of NAS fee premiums to members of these professional bodies compared to those that do not comply with auditing and ethical standards. In conjunction with the primary audit fee results reported in Table 4 , we infer that the type of professional body affiliation matters in the small client segment, consistent with Dunmore and Falk (2001) .
Total auditor work
Prior Australian audit fee research indicates that when the dependent variable (audit fees) is redefined as total auditor work, different results are found. For example, Ferguson and Stokes (2002) find that when the dependent variable is redefined as total auditor work, any support for the existence of leadership premiums in the 'specialist industry' sub-sample disappears. In a second additional test, consistent with Ferguson et al. (2013) we reconfigure the dependent variable from audit fees to total fees including non-audit services for an increased sample of 114,044 SMSFs and split the LEADER_ALL variable between the leading firm and the remaining top ten auditors. 36 The estimation model for all SMSF-year observations reported in Panel D of Table 9 has an F statistic of 512.132, significant at p<.001. The model obtains an adjusted R 2 of .075. Note that the coefficient on LEADER_1 remains negative and significant. In the light of earlier reported results, this suggests the leading supplier of auditing, who is a discounter in terms of audit fees, does not provide more highermargin NAS. In contrast, the LEADER_OTHER coefficient (.132) is found to be both positive and 35 When we replace OPINION with BREACH in sensitivity testing, we do not find a significant relationship between NAS and breach reporting and there is no change to results reported in Tables 7 and 8 . 36 In untabulated results, when we analyse the total auditor work for all top ten leading firms, the LEADER_ALL coefficient (-.108) is negative and significant at p<.001.
significant at p<.001, suggesting the other nine leading firms charge a discount for their audit work, but derive a fee premium from supply of non-audit services. Interestingly, a similar result has been observed in other settings with results in Ferguson et al. (2013) suggesting benefits from industry experience may not manifest in the audit but rather in higher margin non-audit services. To the extent that the dependent variable used in Cullinan (1997 Cullinan ( , 1998a ) may have included non-audit related fees paid to the independent accountant in addition to the audit fee, our results for LEADER_OTHER can be reconciled with the prior findings in this literature. 37, 38, 39 (Insert Table 9 here)
CONCLUSIONS
Using a large sample of proprietary ATO data, we examine audit pricing in the SMSF segment -the fastest growing and largest sector of the $1.75 trillion Australian retirement savings industry. This sample has the advantage of having homogeneous clients in a well-defined, but highly 37 When we repeat this analysis of total auditor work controlling on members of the various professional bodies, in untabulated results we observe similar results to the primary audit fee model for professional bodies in Table 4 Cullinan (1997, p.97) is that the variable used to measure the audit fee may have included non-audit related fees paid to the independent accountant. This suggests that Cullinan (1997)'s dependent variable was effectively 'total fees'. His sample data was obtained from Form 5500, Schedule C's disclosure of the name of and the fees paid to the pension plan's independent accounting firm. The instructions for Form 5500, Schedule C note that the fee disclosed could include fees paid to the independent accountant for other accounting services in addition to the audit. As such, there is a possibility of measurement error in the dependent variable in both these studies (Lindsay 1998) . By virtue of the attributes of our proprietary data, we are able to address this issue in our study as audit fees are separately disclosed in the SMSF annual return. 39 In a further additional test, we consider the impact that the choice of SMSF auditor has on the fund's performance. Intuitively, the higher the expense, the lower the returns, hence the lower likelihood that a higher priced auditor will be selected. We propose that if a high quality audit is performed, the trustees are more likely to comply with the SIS regulations and invest in assets that generate better and more stable returns. We use an OLS regression model with the return on assets as the dependent variable and include the natural log of audit fees as one of the independent variables. In untabulated results, the model for all SMSF-year observations is significant with an F statistic of 892.220, significant at p<.001, with an adjusted R 2 of .125. The coefficient for LEADER_ALL (-.008) is negative and significant at p<.001 suggesting that SMSFs who generate poor returns are likely to limit their costs by selecting a cheap auditor. In a final test, when we split the leading firms the coefficients for LEADER_1 (-.011) and LEADER_OTHER (-.006) are both negative and significant at p<.001. When this test is repeated for professional bodies, we do not find any significant results but we do observe positive and significant coefficients for ICAA (.002) and ATMA (.009) at p<.001 when the professional body affiliations are further dissected. We acknowledge a limitation of this test may be self-selection bias as good funds may seek good auditors. regulated industry. Subject to a limitation in the form of our sample period falling within the Global Financial Crises, we report four primary findings. First, in a setting characterised by the absence of agency costs where demand side incentives for quality auditing are low, we find significant fee discounts for leading individual auditors, with larger suppliers charging lower fees. We interpret this as large suppliers passing on benefits of scale economies. Second, we find that registered company auditors and members of professional bodies who comply with auditing and ethical standards charge higher audit fees than SMSF auditors from other professional bodies.
Third, despite much controversy existing in the literature and concerns from regulators relating to auditors jointly supplying audit and NAS, we report that supply of non-audit services actually improves the auditors' ability to report breaches. This may be due to enhanced client understanding derived from knowledge spillovers derived gained in the joint supply of audit and NAS. Accordingly our evidence would negate any concerns arising from the recent Cooper Review regarding auditor independence on two levels. Firstly, compliance standards in this industry are high evidenced by low levels of breaches and audit qualifications. Secondly, supply of non-audit services by SMSF auditors poses no independence threat. Last, in additional testing when the dependent variable is redefined as NAS, we observe leaders providing more NAS. Thus, auditors in this setting appear to be active in applying scale advantages two ways -providing lower cost audits and using larger client portfolios -as a conduit to supplying higher margin non-audit services. LAF = natural log of audit fees, LTF = natural log of total fees, LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, LCONT = natural log of total concessional contributions received, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, RESERVEACCTS = 1 if reserve accounts, INHOUSE = 1 if inhouse assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, BREACH = 1 if contravention reported, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, OTHERSERVICES = 1 if auditor provided other services. LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, LCONT = natural log of total concessional contributions received, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, RESERVEACCTS = 1 if reserve accounts, INHOUSE = 1 if in-house assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, LEADER_ALL = 1 if top ten leading auditor. LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, LCONT = natural log of total concessional contributions received, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, RESERVEACCTS = 1 if reserve accounts, INHOUSE = 1 if inhouse assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, AG = 1 if auditor is the Auditor-General (or delegate) of the Commonwealth, a state or territory, RCA = 1 if auditor is a registered company auditor, CPA_ICAA_IPA = 1 if auditor is a member of a professional body which complies with auditing and ethical standards. LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, INHOUSE = 1 if in-house assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, FEERESID = error term from audit fee model in primary results in Table 3 , OTHERSERVICES = 1 if auditor provided other services, LEADER_ALL = 1 if top ten leading auditor. LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, INHOUSE = 1 if in-house assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, FEERESID = error term from audit fee model in primary results in Table 4 , OTHERSERVICES = 1 if auditor provided other services AG = 1 if auditor is the Auditor-General (or delegate) of the Commonwealth, a state or territory, RCA = 1 if auditor is a registered company auditor, CPA_ICAA_IPA = 1 if auditor is a member of a professional body which complies with auditing and ethical standards. LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, LCONT = natural log of total concessional contributions received, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, RESERVEACCTS = 1 if reserve accounts, INHOUSE = 1 if in-house assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, LAF = natural log of audit fees paid, LEADER_ALL = 1 if top ten leading auditor. LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, LCONT = natural log of total concessional contributions received, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, RESERVEACCTS = 1 if reserve accounts, INHOUSE = 1 if in-house assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, LAF = natural log of audit fees paid, AG = 1 if auditor is the Auditor-General (or delegate) of the Commonwealth, a state or territory, RCA = 1 if auditor is a registered company auditor, CPA_ICAA_IPA = 1 if auditor is a member of a professional body which complies with auditing and ethical standards. LASSETS = natural log of total assets, PARTICIPANTS = number of members, ROA = ratio of earnings before contributions, insurance premiums and tax to total assets adjusted for average contributions received, LCASH = natural log of cash, LPROPERTY = natural log of property investments, LSHARES = natural log of share investments, FOREIGN = proportion of total assets that invested overseas, LCONT = natural log of total concessional contributions received, ARTWORK = 1 if investment in artwork, collectibles, metals or jewels, BORROWING = 1 if borrowed, RESERVEACCTS = 1 if reserve accounts, INHOUSE = 1 if in-house assets, DISPOSAL = 1 if disposal of an asset which has resulted in a CGT event, LOSSES = 1 if loss incurred after grossing up of net capital gains, adding back contributions and franking credits received and insurance premiums made, OPINION = 1 if qualified audit opinion, LAG = 1 if audit completed after the lodgment due date, LEADER_1 = 1 if leading auditor, LEADER_OTHER = 1 if top ten leading auditor, other than leading auditor.
